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RECENT CASES
to serve all and still require him to serve at his risk. Some courts
have based their adherence to this rule on the fact that, like a public
carrier, he is a mere conduit, not asserting any right. Others say
that he is excused because it would not be in the interest of the trade
and the steady flow of commerce to burden the warehouseman or
commission merchant with the duty of carefully checking the title of
each and every consignor, and additionally, force him to bear the
risk that the consignor will state his true name and address which
would be necessary to such a check. Any one of these ,or all together
would be adequate justification of the rule of the Abernathy case.
It is a good rule, and it is still the law in Kentucky. Judge H. Church
Ford recognized this in a case which came before him on the Frank-
fort Docket, U. S. District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky as
recently as Feb. 1, 1954. In that case23 the facts were basically the same
as in the principal case. The defendant warehouse company filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and in that motion relied
solely on the Abernathy case. The court, considering the brief sus-
tained the motion and dismissed the case as to the warehouse company.
It must be concluded from this evidence that the court in the
principal case failed to follow the law of Kentucky due to a miscon-
ception as to what that law was. It would be desirable if the Abernathy
case were reaffirmed to preserve a well-reasoned and just exception
to the harsh rule of liability which was established when all agents
and factors selected whom they would serve and when the relation-
ship was purely personal, not public. The exception would do no
violence to the present recording statute.
JAMES H. BYRDWELL
PLEADNGs-KENTuCKY RuLEs OF Civi. lNocDrm -Rui. 8.01-DoS
PLrAD NrG AN ExpnEss CoNTRAcr PEma=r REcomRY UPON AN Ivnr
CoNmAcr?-The plaintiff brought an action to recover on an oral con-
tract for services performed for decedent. The complaint alleged that
the decedent promised "to pay to her or to will or convey to her" cer-
tain real property in consideration of personal services rendered by
the plaintiff to the decedent. The complaint set out in detail the nature
of the services rendered, the circumstances surrounding the agree-
ment, and the plaintiff's performance. There was a demand for a
judgment of $6,500, the alleged reasonable value of the land. The
23 U.S. v. Tilley, Tilley, and Kentuckiana Tobacco Warehouse Co., Civ.
Action 117, Frankfort Docket, Feb. 1, 1954.
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defendant executor made a motion for a judgment on the pleadings.'
Plaintiff conceded that the oral contract was within the statute of
frauds and therefore unenforceable, but contended that the pleading
disclosed an implied contract to pay for services rendered, and that
recovery for the reasonable value of the services should be allowed
upon a quantum meruit basis. The Fayette County Circuit Court
granted defendant's motion for a judgment on the pleadings, and the
plaintiff appealed. Held: affirmed. One who relies solely upon an
express contract cannot recover on an implied contract not pleaded,
and the complaint did not contain sufficient allegations of an implied
contract since there was nothing therein to notify the defendant that
recovery was being sought on a quantum meruit. Pryor v. York's
Executor, 305 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1957).
This case presents a question requiring the construction of Rule
8.01 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure for a determination of
the sufficiency of a complaint with regard to the plaintiff's theory of
the case. That Rule provides:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third party claim, shall contain (1)
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several
different types may be demanded.
This Rule, as well as the rest of the Kentucky Rules, finds its basis
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 The Civil Code Committee,
at the instance of the judges and practicing attorneys of Kentucky,3
considered and substantially adopted the entire body of Federal Rules.
The Committee considered each Federal Rule individually, and re-
search was done in order to determine its meaning and effect;4 it was
then either adopted verbatim or altered to conform with Kentucky's
' The statement of the procedural facts of the case in the opinion is incom-
plete. Under Ky. R. Civ. P. 12.03, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may
be made after the pleadings are closed and within such time as not to delay trial.
The defendant, therefore, must have filed an answer, or his motion would have
been premature. The probable procedure was: The defendant ified an answer
setting up the affirmative defense of the statute of frauds, and the plaintiff, think-
ing that his complaint sufficiently alleged a quantum meruit, elected to stand on
his pleadings; the defendant then made a motion for a judgment on the pleadings,
and his motion was granted. The plaintiff then appealed, claiming error in the
granting of the motion for judgment.
2 Ky. R. Civ. P. 8.01 uses the exact language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), except
for the Federal Rule's requirement for "a short and plain statement of the grounds
upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdic-
tion and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it . . .
3 Fowler and Catlett, "Report of the Civil Code Committee," 16 Ky. S.B.J.
23 (1951).
4 Sims, "The Work of Kentucky's Civil Code Committee," 40 Ky. L.J. 7, 8-9
(1951).
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needs. Thus, in_ order to ascertain the intended construction for the
Kentucky Rule, it is necessary to look at the construction given its
federal counterpart.
The majority5 of federal courts have taken the position that a
"generalized summary of the case that affords fair notice is all that is
required" of a complaint.6 It matters not whether the complaint states
"conclusions" or "facts" so long as the adversary is given fair notice,
and the statement of the claim is short and plain.7 And although it
is not enough for the complaint merely to expose a grievance," or create
only a suspicion that the plaintiff might be able to state grounds for
relief,9 a complaint is sufficient if it gives the opposing party fair notice
of the claim asserted and gives a general indication of the type of
litigation involved.' 0 There is no necessity to state a "cause of action"
in the technical sense,1" for technicalities are no longer of their former
importance; 12 nevertheless, the complaint still must state a cause of
action in that it must show that the pleader is entitled to relief.13
As against a motion which tests its sufficiency, a complaint is con-
strued liberally,14 and in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, with
all doubts resolved in his favor.15 It is not to be dismissed unless it
appears certain that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim
asserted. 16
5 2 Moore, Federal Practice, 1649 (2d ed. 1948).
6 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 41
(N.D. Cal. 1939).
7 2 Moore, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1650.
8 Id. at 1653.
9 Hays v. Hercules Powder Co., 7 F.R.D. 599 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
10 Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F. 2d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1942);
Turkish State Railways Administration v. Vulcan Iron Works, 153 F. Supp. 616,
617 (M.D. Pa. 1957).
11Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944); Swenson v. Suhl,
19 F.R.D. 517, 520 (D. Neb. 1956).
12 Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F. 2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1942).
13 2 Moore, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1653.
14 Dioguardi v. During, 139 F. 2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); Reliable Machine
Works v. Unger, 144 F. Supp. 726, 728 (S.D. N.Y. 1956); Welcher v. United
States, 14 F.R.D. 235, 237 (E.D. Ark. 1953); Tobin v. Chambers Const. Co., 15
F.R.D. 47, 48-49 (D. Neb. 1952); Gay v. E. H. Moore, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 749,
750 (E.D. Okla. 1939).
15 Cool v. International Shoe Co., 142 F. 2d 318 (8th Cir. 1944); Swenson v.
Sub, 19 F.R.D. 517 (D. Neb. 1956); Boerstler v. American Medical Ass'n, 16
F.R.D. 437 (N.D. IlI. 1954); United States Guarantee Co. v. Mountaineer Engi-
neering Co., 12 F.R.D. 520 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Smedley v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,
12 F.R.D. 355 (D. Neb. 1951).
"6Seymour v. Union News Co., 217 F. 2d 168 (7th Cir. 1954); United
States v. Farina, 153 F. Supp. 819 (D. N.J. 1957); Wilson v. United States, 144
F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Welcher v. United States, 14 F.R.D. 235 (E.D.
Ark. 1953); Smedley v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., supra note 16; Howell v. Gray, 9
F.R.D. 544 (D. Neb. 1949); Porter v. Eliott, 5 F.R.D. 223 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
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In general, the federal courts have followed the spirit and purpose
of the Federal Rules, and have applied them "with the flexibility and
liberality that their framers intended."17
Perhaps the best illustration of what is meant by "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"
is found in the Official Forms. These Forms "are sufficient under the
rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of state-
ment which the rules contemplate."18 The Form for a complaint for
money lent is:
Defendant owes plaintiff ten thousand dollars for money lent by plain-
tiff to defendant on June 1, 1950.
Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defendant for the sum
of ten thousand dollars, interest, and costs.19
Notwithstanding the success of the liberal construction of Federal
Rule 8 (a),20 there were, prior to any court decision, indications that
Kentucky might not desire as liberal an interpretation of its Rule.2'
Typical of this attitude toward Rule 8.01 is the following statement
of two members of the Civil Code Committee:
The proposed rules make no fundamental change in the content of
pleadings, although they do adopt a new terminology. . . . In one
sense the present and the proposed requirement are identical, since
a stated claim which gives rise to a legal or equitable relief is the
essence of what we term a "cause of action." The real difference is
one of emphasis .... 22
This change of emphasis was designed to do away with the tech-
nicalities associated with a "cause of action."23 In other words, the
new Rule was adopted with the intention of liberalizing the formal
requirements for stating a cause of action, without abandoning the
underlying substantive principles.
24
This proposed construction was seemingly accepted by the court
in the first case to test the sufficiency of a complaint drawn under
Rule 8.01.25 While holding that a complaint was insufficient if it failed
to allege a fact essential to the plaintiff's right of action, the court said:
We may agree with the appellants' argument as to the liberality of
the new Rules of Procedure with respect to stating a cause of action.
17 Holtzoff, "Federal Civil Procedure-A Challenge to the States," 40 Ky. L.J.
11, 14 (1951).
18 Ky. R. Civ. P. Rule 84.
19 Form 5, Ky. R. Civ. P., Appendix of Official Forms.
20 See Clay, Kentucky Civil Rules, Pocket Part, 14-15 (1957).
2 1 Fowler and Catlett, supra note 3, at 27.
2 2 Fowler and Catlett, supra note 3, at 27.
23 Clay, Kentucky Civil Rules 88, 90 (1954).
24 Id. at 90.
2 5 Johnson v. Coleman, 288 S.W. 2d 348 (Ky. 1956), 45 Ky. L.J. 367 (1957).
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.. . But the simplification and liberality extend to the manner of
stating a case and are not so great as to obviate the necessity of stat-
ing the elements of a cause of action. .. 26 (Emphasis added).
These words appear to imply that a meritorious claim would not
be held insufficient because of a formal error. Thus it seemed that
the court would construe the Rule according to the intent of the Civil
Code Committee,27 and in accordance with the manifested purpose
of the new Rules.
28
The principal case appears to have dispelled that illusion. The
court held (1) that one who relied solely upon an express contract
could not recover on a quantum meruit, and (2) that the complaint
did not contain a sufficient'plea on the implied contract to warrant
recovery, since it did not notify the defendant that recovery was being
sought on a quantum meruit basis. It is submitted that the basis of
the court's first conclusion is an inapplicable technical rule, and that
the Rules themselves do not require any more notice than was con-
tained in the plaintiffs complaint.
It is true, as Judge Bird stated, that the court had not departed
from its 1948 holding in Cheatham'~s Exr v. Parr20 that one who relies
on an express contract could not recover on an implied contract which
was not pleaded. However, there had heretofore been no actual oc-
casion to abandon such a holding, since this is the first case to test the
issue after the adoption of the new Rules. The rationalization of the
past decisions forming the basis of this rule was that the variance be-
tween the pleadings and the proof was fatal.30 Even the most cursory
study of the new Rules would make it superfluous to cite reasons for
saying that what was previously considered a fatal variance would
not necesarily be considered such under the new Rules. It therefore
becomes necessary to inquire into the nature of this technical,31 but
fatal, variance in order to determine its present applicability.
26 Id. at 349.
27 See Fowler and Catlett, supra note 3, at 27.
2 8 Ky. R. Civ. P. 1 provides: "They [the Rules] shall be construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
20308 Ky. 175, 214 S.W. 2d 91 (1948).
30 Fowler v. Thompson, 193 Ky. 593, 236 S.W. 1047 (1922); Smith v. Robin-
son, 185 Ky. 76, 214 S.W. 771 (1919); Newton's Ex'r v. Field, 98 Ky. 186, 32 S.W.
623 (1895).
31Meem Haskins Coal Corp. v. Pratt, 299 Ky. 767, 187 S.W. 2d 435 (1945).
In this case, the plaintiff alleged only an express contract, but the court permitted
recovery on quantum meruit. There was a misunderstanding between the parties
as to the price to be paid for the labor, and therefore, no contract existed. But the
court said the rule that one could not plead only an express contract and recover
on a quantum meruit should not apply to situations where the plaintiff performed
services under what was intended to be an express contract, but failed to be such
for lack of agreement on an essential element. While so holding, the court said:
"The general rule is that where only an express contract is pleaded, recovery can-
not be had on proof of an implied contract ... At best, the rule is technical, and
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A variance is defined as a divergence between a party's allegations
and. his proof.3 2 A party is not required to prove all that he pleads,
unless it is essential to his claim or defense,33 but he cannot prove
anything not pleaded, for to permit him to do so would allow him to
surprise the other party.34 Therefore, a fatal variance occurs when a
fact esential to a pleader's cause of action is proved, but not pleaded.
The Kentucky cases holding that recovery on a quantum meruit
cannot be had when only an express contract is pleaded do not explain
the variance; they simply hold that there is a fatal variance, and then
drop the matter. These cases were all decided under the Code, and
the pleading of an implied contract in quantum meruit under the
Code was substantially the same as at common law.3 5 The essential
allegations of a quantum meruit count of general assumpsit at com-
mon law were (a) the plaintiffs performance of personal services for
the defendant at the defendant's request, (b) the defendant's fictional
promise, in consideration of the services rendered, to pay the reason-
able value of the services, (c) the defendant's breach of this promise,
and (d) the plaintiff's damage as a result of this breach.36 Since the
fictional promise and breach could not be proved, the only proof re-
quired to sustain such an action was the proof of the services rendered
under circumstances implying a promise to pay there for and the
reasonable value of those services.
A complaint on an express contract necessarily included an allega-
tion of the plaintiff's performance, and a prayer for damages in the
sum of the agreed contract price, but it did not include an allegation
under which proof of the reasonable value of the services performed
could be offered. Therein was the fatal variance-the difference be-
tween the damages prayed for in a complaint on an express contract,
and the proof of the reasonable value of the services rendered, which
was essential to recovery on a quantum meruit. However, this differ-
ence does not exist under the Rules. There is no need for the com-
plaint expressly to demand judgment for the reasonable value of the
services rendered before evidence of that value can be introduced.37
it should not be applied to facts like those in the present case." Id. at 771, 187
S.W. 2d at 488. It should not be applied in this type of case, one wonders how
it can be applied in the principle case, where there was an actual contract, but it
could not be enforced because of the statute of frauds.
3241 Am. Jur., Pleading, see. 370 (1942).
33 Id. see. 869.
34 Id. see. 868.
35 Clark, Code Pleading 292 (2d ed. 1947).
36 Shipman, Common Law Pleading, 254-257 (3rd ed. 1923).
37See Form 4, Ky. R. Civ. P., Appendix of Official Forms. This form is
actually what was a quantum valebant count, but it does not require that the
plaintiff expressly state that he is demanding the reasonable value of the goods.
[Vol. 47,
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All that is required is a demand for a judgment for the damages to
which the plaintiff deems himself entitled.a8 Thus the variance, which
was the basis of the rule upon which the court predicted its first
holding, no longer exists, and it would seem that the court has used
an inapplicable precedent as the basis of this part of the decision.
The court's second holding; i.e., that the complaint was insufficient
in that it failed to give the defendant notice that the plaintiff intended
to proceed on the theory of implied contract,39 is based upon equally
tenuous grounds. Even if the distinction between the forms of the
demands for judgment between a complaint on an express contract
and one on an implied contract in quantum meruit still exists, it is
difficut to understand how a plaintiffs failure to make such a distinc-
tion could be prejudicial to the defendant. It is true that a complaint
based on an express contract alleges more than a common count, and
that the defendant may prepare his defense accordingly, but wherein
is the lack of notice? The allegation of the plaintiffs performance is
the same in both types of complaints. The only possible lack of notice
would be concerned with the proof of damages. Since an action on an
express contract demands damages for the contract price, and re-
covery on a quantum meruit gives damages in accordance with the
benefit conferred upon the defendant, the defendant possibly would
not be prepared to submit evidence on the reasonable value of the
services rendered. But how could this be considered a lack of notice
which would render a pleading insufficient? The Rules themselves
He demands only a specific sum, regardless of whether the sum was agreed upon,
or whether it is for the reasonable value of the goods. Since these forms are set
forth as examples, and since the only difference between a quantum valebant
count and a quantum meruit count is that one is for goods sold and delivered
and the other is for services rendered, it is clear that this same form would be
sufficient for a complaint in quantum meruit, and it need not allege that the
plaintiff is seeking the reasonable value of the services.
38Ky. R. Civ. P. 8.01. See also Rule 54.03, infra, note 41.
39 In discussing this point the court said:
"The plaintffs pleadings in this case disclose a set of circumstances
which may possibly have given rise to an implied contract authorizing
a recovery upon quantum meruit. However, to meet the requirements
of the rule regarding notice to the adversary, a pleading must do
more than merely expose a right of recovery or a right to rely upon a
certain defense. The pleadings must show clearly that action is being
taken on that right of recovery, or that the right to a defense is being
asserted as such." (Emphasis added).
Pryor v. York's Ex'r, 305 S.W. 2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1957). This was said after
stating that one of the purposes of pleadings is to give notice to the other party
of the claim or defense. Even though this may be (and undoubtedly is) a pur-
pose of pleading, it does not necessarily follow that a pleading which does not
give such notice is insufficient as against a motion for a judgment on the pleadings.
It is also doubtful that this statement of purposes of pleadings has attained the
status of a rule since it was not included in the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under the Fed. R. Civ. P., one is not required to plead the theory of his case.
2 Moore, supra note 5, at 1656-58.
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have provided that, except in cases of a default judgment, every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the successful party is entitled,
even if such relief has not been demanded in the pleadings.40 As
stated by Clay, "The question is not whether the plaintiff has asked
the proper remedy but whether his pleadings shows him entitled to
any remedy."41 The complaint under discussion alleged the plaintiffs
performance of services for the defendant, at his request, for which
there has been no payment. This alone would seem to be sufficient
to show that the plaintiff is entitled to some remedy.
Through the use of the Official Forms both as guides for formula-
tion and criteria for sufficiency, one is led conclusively to believe that
the plaintiff's complaint would have been sufficient if it had been
stated thusly:
Defendant owes plaintiff six thousand, five-hundred dollars for services
rendered by plaintiff to defendant between (the dates of employment).
Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for the
sum of six thousand, five-hundred dollars, interest, and costs.
After comparing this complaint, which is sufficient, with the one
in the principal case, it becomes exceedingly difficult to understand
how the latter could be said to be insufficient in that it fails to give
the defendant adequate notice.
Conclusion
Thus it appears that the Court of Appeals has brushed aside the
federal decisions as precedent, as well as Rule 1 of the Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure, the intent of the Civil Code Committee, the pur-
pose of the new rules, and the unequivocal dictum in Johnson v. Cole-
man, and has permitted a technical and purely formal error in the
statement of a claim for relief to defeat what is a seemingly meritouri-
ous basis of action.
It is certainly hoped that this is not the construction of Rule 8.01
that is to be followed in the future, for if it is, the efficacy of the entire
body of Rules seems seriously impaired and both the spirit and pur-
pose of the Rules rendered nugatory.
Carl R. Clontz
4 0 Ky. R. Civ. P. 54.03 provides:
"Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default
for want of appearance, every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the
party had not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
41 Clay, Kentucky Civil Rules 93 (1954).
[Vol. 47,
